N. J. Meagher v. Uintah Gas Company et al : Supplemental Brief and Statement of Amicus Curiae by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
N. J. Meagher v. Uintah Gas Company et al :
Supplemental Brief and Statement of Amicus
Curiae
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Burton W. Musser; Amicus Curiae;
This Brief of Amicus Curiae is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Meagher v. Uintah Gas Company, No. 7723 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1574
Civil No. 7723 
lAY~· Uli;U~U 
U. of U. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. J. MEAGHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
UINTAH GAS COMPANY and 
VALLEY FUEL SUPPLY COM-
PANY, 
D-efendants, 
RAY PHEBUS·, ASHLEY VALLEY 
OIL COMPANY, PAUL STOCK and 
JOE T. JUHAN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AND STATEMENT 
OF· AMICUS CURIAE 
F 1 l .... ~~~ "Du~TON ~- MUSSER 
-~ ~ n . .. c r: 0 Armcus Cur1ae 
r\Pr\ J \) L. 8 J 307 Utah Oil Building 
----··· .. --.. -------.. ----c--.--,- ~:;··r S·al t Lake City 1, Utah 
-. e ~' .. JI. __ , 
. -~' .~rk. s·,y_pt'er.n 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
PRELII\IIN ARY STATEMENT ························-······-···-·-··-····-·-·· 2 
1. Rehearing is granted \vhen a decisive question has 
been overlooked by the opinion of this Court.................... 2 
2. Rehearing is granted where a new and important 
principle of lav; is involved ...... ---···-··-·········---··-··-·····-··-··-····-- 2 
ARGUMENT 
The mandate ........................... ······--·--·-... ______ ---------.-------- .. -- --· 2 
A question of substance or of jurisdiction may be 
raised by this Court sua sponte____________________________________________ 9 
(A) By amicus curire _____ . ___ . __ . _. __ . _. __ ··-----------------------------· 9 
(B) By the Court sua sponte_________________________________________ 10 
The Stock paper----------------------------------------------··---------------------· 10 
TABLE OF CASES 
Columbia 1\-iining Company v. Holter, 1 Mont. 429______________________ 8 
Frye v. King County, 289 P. 18 (Wash.)-------------------------------------- 7 
Hardy v. Meadows, 71 Utah 255, 264 P. 968 ________________________________ 10 
Illinois v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 184 U.S. 77, 
46 L. ed. 440------------------------------------------ ___ --------------·------- ---------· 8 
Kimpton v. Jubilee Mining Company, 55 P. 918 (Mont.)__________ 8 
Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, 23 L. ed. 70 ____________________________________ 10 
McClung v. Harris, 65 P. 941 (Okla.)------------------------------------------ 7 
Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. et al., 112 Utah 149, 185 P. 2d 
7 4 7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
lYiorrow v. Morrow, 156 P. 2d 827 (Nev.)------------------------------------ 9 
Phebus et al. v. Dunford, Judge, et al., 198 P. 2d 973________________ 3 
\Vood\vard v. Perkins, 171 P. 2d 997 (Mont.)______________________________ 8 
Forbes v. Butler, 73 ·uta·h--522 --
275 P. 772 ----------------: ______ _ 
Powerine Co. v. Zion's Sav. Bank 
~ rr,.,n ~ t C!n ... .. 106 Utah 384, 
------------
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. J. MEAGHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
UINTAH GAS CO~IP ANY and 
VALLEY FUEL SUPPLY COM-
PANY, 
D-efendants, 
RAY PHEBUS·, ASHLEY VALLEY 
OIL COMP_.._~NY, PAUL STOCK and 
JOE T. JUHAN, 
Defendants and .Appellants. 
Civil No. 7723 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AND STATEMEN·T 
OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Since filing his brief herein amicus curiae has, with 
his associates, devoted considerable time in the search 
for precedents and in reflecting on the questions involved 
in the failure of the lower court to conform to the man-
date. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Scores of cases were found, a few of them are in-
cluded herein. This supplemental brief and statement is 
tendered out of a sense of duty to the Court. I cannot 
state that there are no authorities against the position 
taken on the mandate feature, but I can state that in our 
search, which I assure the Court was diligent, we found 
none. 
Preliminarily, amicus curiae, paraphrasing the lang-
uage used in respondent's reply brief, (pps. 1 and 2) 
says: 
1. Rehearing is granted when a decisive question 
has been overlooked by the opinion of this Court, and 
2. Where a new and important principle of la-\v is 
involved. 
THE MANDATE. 
In the original appeal (No. 6972, decision filed Oc-
tober 27, 1947, 185 P. 2d 747) only two questions were 
considered and solved by this Court : 
" ( 1) Does the general provision of the con-
tract to the effect that its purpose is solely and 
only for the mining and operating for oil and gas 
contemplate exploration beyond the specific re--
quirements of the contract to avoid its termina-
tion rand (2) Has there been an abandonment of 
the gas rights under the lease~" 
This Court then determined that the lease had not 
been forfeited nor abandoned. The cause was rem·anded 
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3 
to the lo"'"er court for proceedings to conform to the 
op1n1on. 
In Phebus et al. t'. Dunford, J·ndge, et al. (No. 7187, 
decision filed November 8, 1948, 198 P .2d 973), this Court 
again sets out the original mandate and says : 
'~For a foundation for that direction we 
n1erely invite attention to the citation above, and 
the two questions (issues) decided therein." (Em-
phasis added). 
From this it is sho\vn that the mandate is specific 
and could have been executed and conformed to with a 
slight effort by the lower court. 
The mandate did not grant respondent a new trial 
on any issue; nor did it direct a rehearing on any issue; 
nor "\Yere new pleadings directed or permitted. There is 
no uncertainty in it. No ambiguity. The two issues in 
the original appeal and in the mandamus proceedings. had 
been spelled out. What could the lower court do to pro-
ceed in conformity with the opinion~ 
The trial judge in his memorandum decision clearly 
demonstrated that he must have misapprehended the 
meaning of the mandate. He held that it was his duty 
under the mandate to determine all of· the rights of all 
of the parties under the lease AI, as modified by A5 
(Mem. Dec. p. 28). The lower court holds that by the 
reversal of· its judgment by this Court a new situation 
was presented. The trial judge then states: 
"The Supreme Court directed further pro-
ceedings in conformity with that situation, * * *." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Innocently enough the lower court then interprets 
the mandate as a direction for it: 
"* * * to determine the parties' rights under 
the lease. The plaintiff was compelled to accept 
that interpretation, and moved to have his rights, 
as well as the rights of the defendants thereunder, 
determined." (Mem. Dec. p. 28). 
On page 30 of its memorandum decision, again re-
ferring to the remittitur, the lower court says that the 
remittitur ordered further proceedings because, it may 
be assumed, the "plaintiff has obtained absolutely noth-
ing by this proceedings (sic) to date." Thereupon, at 
page 36 of the memorandum decision, the lower court 
comes to this conclusion: 
"The Court having heretofore held under the 
mandate of the Supreme Court, that its duty is 
to determine and settle the rights in the property 
under AI and A5, it is then necessary to determine 
just what interest the parties presently have 
under those instruments." 
Commencing on page 52 of the memoranduln decision 
the lower court proceeds to outline a decree which is 
ordered entered. 
"* * * prescribing, defining and adjudicating 
the rights of the parties to this action in and to 
the 480 acres of land in issue * * * ~" 
Then it is that the lower court adjudicates and de-
termines all of the rights under all of the exhibits in 
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favor of and against (1) the plaintiff, N. J. Meagher, 
(2) defendant Ashley \'"ailey Oil Company, (3) defendant 
Ray Phebus, ( 4) defendant Paul Stock, ( 5) defendant 
Joe T. Juhan, (6) defendant \'alley Fuel Supply Com-
pany, and (7) defendant lTintah Gas Company. 
On second appeal the opinion states: 
··Since our for1ner decision, three claims were 
allowed to be brought into the case :" 
1) By amendm·ent l\1eagher asserted claim 
to an oil royalty assigned in 1930 to Stock and 
Phebus. :2) By counterclaim Stock asserted a one-
half interest in the operating rights to the· 440 
acres. 3) By amended reply Meagher claimed that 
one-half interest. See Op. par. 2. 
The record shows Stock's counterclaim came after 
Meagher's amended reply. The sequence in the opinion 
misleads the reader. 
The lower court also awarded operating rights in the 
N. 40 to Meagher, which this Court awarded to Ashley 
Valley Oil Company (with modification). 
The case was again remanded : 
" * * * with instructions to modify the con-
elusions of law and judgment to conform to this 
decision, * * *." 
Mistakenly, the lower court had wholly disregarded 
the terms of the first mandate. 
"The decision of the lower court is reversed, 
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and the case remanded to that court for proceed-
ings to conform to this opinion." 
The lower court, of course, had no jurisdiction to 
allow the three new claims to be brought into the case 
nor had it jurisdiction to award to Meagher or Ashley 
Valley Oil Company the N. 40. Disregarding its juris-
diction limitations, it sought to and did litigate all of 
the issues between all of the parties growing out of lease 
AI as modified by A5. 
Nothing demonstrates more clearly the utter failure 
of the lower court to follow the n1andate than the "State-
ment of Points" found in Respondent's Answer to Peti-
tion for Rehearing, p. a. It is there asseTted that nine 
new decisions were made-correctly made. 
\Vhen this Court entered its judgment in the first 
appeal the "Hour of Decision" had passed. Presently we 
are not concerned whether these decisions were made 
correctly or incorrectly. The error lies in making them. 
They were not made in conformity with the opinion and 
judgment of this Court in the first appeal. Neither were 
the three new claims allowed to be brought in within the 
terms of that mandate. Nor, under the mandate, could 
the lower court award the N. 40 to Meagher or to Ashley 
Valley Oil Company. In vain we search the mandate for 
authority or instruction for either. 
·The mandate of the first decision and the mandate 
of the second decision are substantially the san1e. The 
lower court could have conformed to the first mandate 
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as it is now instructed to conform to the second mandate. 
If the lower court treats the second mandate as it did the 
first mandate, the end of nine years of wearisome litiga-
tion is not yet in sight. 
It is becoming clearer and clearer that everything 
done by the lower court after remittitur should be va-
cated, set aside and held for naught. 
In Frye c. King County, 289 P. 18 (Wash.) the court 
says: 
HThe mandate of this court is binding on the 
superior court, and must be strictly followed. 
Having reversed the judgment and remanded the 
case to the trial court, with instructions to enter 
judgment in accordance with our opinion, 'that 
order is conclusive and no judgment different 
therefrom can be entered by the trial court. Vol-
ume 2, p. 89. R.C.L." 
In i~cClung v. Harris, 65 P. 941 (Okla.), the court 
says: 
"When the mandate from this court reached 
the court below, the plaintiff presented an 
amended petition, setting up facts which occurred 
prior to the trial of the original case appealed to 
this court, and asked leave to- file the same, and 
to be permitted to litigate the additional matter 
set up in such amended ·petition. The plaintiff's 
application to amend was denied, and from this 
orde-r and the judgment entered by the district 
court pursuant to the mandate from this court 
plaintiff appeals, and the defendant in error 
moves the dismissal of such appeal. 
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"In our judgm®t, the motion should be sus-
tained. It was the duty of the plaintiff to plead 
all of the facts which would afford him any relief 
in the case when it was tried the first time in the 
court below., This court took the record as it 
found it, and from that record the defendant was 
clearly entitled to the relief granted, and, under 
the facts disclosed by the case-made, in equity 
and under the authorities, no other judgment 
should have been rendered. The trial court, under 
the mandate, had no · discretion in the premises, 
* * * " 
Some authorities hold that the function of the lower 
court, after mandate, is merely ministerial. See Kimpton 
v. Jubilee Mining Company, 55 P. 918 (Mont.) ; Wood-
ward v. Perkilns, 171 P.2d 997 (Mont.); Columbia Mining 
Comparn.y v. Holter, 1 (Mont.) 429, where the court said: 
"The mandate was the imperative command 
of the supervisory court to a subordinate court. 
The court below was powerless to disobey." 
The parties are not entitled to introduce, and the 
court to which the cause has been remanded has no 
authority to entertain, new issues. Illinois v. Illinois 
Central Railroad Company, 184 U.S·. 77, 46 L. ed. 440. 
"The inferior court is bound by the decree 
as the law of the case, and must carry it into 
execution, according to the mandate. They can-
not vary it, or examine it for any other purpose· 
than execution, or give any other or further relief, 
or review it upon any matter decided on appeal 
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See also Powerine Co. v. Zion's Sav. Bank 
& Trust Co., 106 Utah 384, 148 P.2d 807 and 
Forbes v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772. 
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE OR OF 
JURISDICTION MAY BE RAIS·ED BY THIS 
COURT SUA SPONTE. 
(A) By amicus curiae. 
Jlorrow v. Morrow, 156 P. 2d 827 (Nev.): 
·~Defendant insists that the amicus curiae 
was \Yithout authority to make the motion to 
dismiss the appeal. Our consideration of this con-
tention satisfies us tnat he vvas competent to make. 
it. The order appointing him because of the 
important question involved, did not limit him 
exclusively to advising the· c.ourt as to that ques-
tion, as defendant contends. We are likewise 
satisfied, after examining the record, together 
with the evidence introduced by the amicus curiae· 
on the hearing of the motion that the appeal 
should be dismissed. 
"First, as to the competency of the movent, 
it has been held in this and other jurisdictions 
that it is within the province of an attorney as 
an amicus. curiae, to move to dismiss an action 
on the ground that it is collusive or fictitious. · 
Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Nev. 127, 26 
P. 64, 12 L.R.A. 815; Muskogee Gas, etc., Co. 
v. Haskell, 38 Okl. 358, 132 P. 1098, Ann. Cas. 
1915A, 190; Ward v. Alsup, 100 Tenn. 619, 46 
S.W. 573; Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club, 14 
Misc. 350, 36 N.Y.S .. 126, 128; 2 Am. Jur. pp. 
681-2, sec. 6. In the Nevada case, Haley v. Eureka 
County Bank, sup·ra, the court held that an attor-
ney as amicus curiae may move to dismiss an 
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in the case when it was tried the first time in the 
court below. , This court took the record as it 
found it, and from that record the defendant was 
clearly entitled to the relief granted, and, under 
the facts disclosed by the case-made, in equity 
and under the authorities, no other judgment 
should have been rendered. The trial court, under 
the mandate, had no discretion in the prem1ses, 
* * * " 
Some authorities hold that the function of the lower 
--y 
v court, after mandate, is merely ministerial. See Kimpton 
v . Jubilee Mining Company, 55 P. 918 (Mont.); Wood-
UJ'ard' v. Perkins, 171 P.2d 997 (Mont.); Columbia Mining 
Company v. Holter, 1 (Mont.) 429, where the court said: 
"The mandate was the imperative command 
of the supervisory court to a subordinate court. 
The court below was powerless to disobey." 
The parties are not entitled to introduce, and the 
court to which the cause has been remanded has no 
authority to entertain, new issues. Illinois v. Illinois 
Central Railroad Company, 184 U.S. 77, 46 L. ed. 440. 
"The inferior court is bound by the decree· 
as the law of the case, and must carry it into 
execution, according to the 1nandate. They can-
not vary it, or examine it for any other purpose· 
than execution, or give any other or further relief, 
or review it upon any matter decided on appeal 
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for error apparent, or intermeddle with it, further 
than to settle so much as has been remanded." 
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE OR OF 
JURISDICTION nfA Y BE RAIS-ED BY THIS 
COURT SUA SPONTE. 
(A) By amicus curiae. 
Morrow v. Morrow, 156 P. 2d 827 (Nev.): 
"Defendant insists that the amicus curiae 
was \Yithout authority to make the motion to 
dismiss the appeal. Our consideration of this con-
tention satisfies us th_at he was competent to make 
it. The order appointing him because of the 
important question involved, did not limit him 
exclusively to advising the· court as to that ques-
tion, as defendant contends. We are likewise 
satisfied, after examining the record, together 
with the evidence introduced by the amicus curiae 
on the hearing of the motion that the appeal 
should be dismissed. 
"First, as to the competency of the movent, 
it has been held in this and other jurisdictions 
that it is within the province of an attorney as 
an amicus curiae, to move to dismiss an action 
on the ground that it is collusive or fictitious. · 
Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Nev. 127, 26 
P. 64, 12 L.R.A. 815; Muskogee Gas, etc., Co. 
v. Haskell, 38 Okl. 358, 132 P. 1098, Ann. Cas. 
1915A, 190; Ward v. Alsup, 100 Tenn. 619, 46 
S.W. 573; Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club, 14 
Misc. 350, 36 N.Y.S .. 126, 128; 2 Am. Jur. pp. 
681-2, sec. 6. In the Nevada case, H_aley v. Eureka 
County Bank, sup-ra, the court held that an attor-
ney as amicus curiae may move to dismiss an 
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action as collusive. The court said (21 Nev. 127, 
26 P. 68): 
'It is not only the right, but the duty, of 
an attorney of the court, if he knows or has 
reason to believe that the time of the court is 
being taken up by the trial of a feigned issue, 
to so inform the judge thereof; and it is dis-
cretionary with the court to stay proceed-
ings, make due inquiry, and, if the facts war-
rant the suggestion, then dismiss the case.' " 
(B) By the Court sua sponte. 
Hardy v. Meadows, 71 Utah 255, 264 P. 968. 
"But matters of substance or of subject-n1at-
ter jurisdiction may not be waived. These need 
neither objection, exception, nor assignments of 
error. With respect to them courts, sua sponte, 
open the record and take notice of defects of 
substance and of subject-matter jurisdiction with-
out regard to the wishes of either party named 
on the record." 
In Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, 23 L. ed. 70, where 
there was lack of jurisdiction, the court said: 
"In the present case the objection was not 
made by demurrer, plea or answer, nor was it 
suggested by counsel; nevertheless if it clearly 
exists it is the duty· of the court sua sponte to 
recognize and give it effect." 
THE STOCK PAPER. 
The bargain made by Jacob with Esau would not 
be condoned by this Court. 
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Esau knew that by the very terms of that bargain 
he could never enjoy his inheritance. A court of justice 
kno\YS other,Yise. The bargain lacked adequacy of con-
sideration. So also 'Yas it coercive. 
For an acco1nmodation Stock gave a paper to 
:Jieagher. nleagher asked for the paper to quiet title. 
He then used it -to show forfeiture and abandonment. 
He no'v claims the paper to reap for himself a sum of 
1noney in excess of $700,000.00. 
The hardship is so flagrant, the misadventure so in 
doubt, the oppression so apparent, the deal so uncon-
scionable as to appall the Court and outrage the feelings 
of men seeking to do and receive right. Cordoza once 
said: 
"When all is said and done justice is the 
synonym of an aspiration, a mood of exultation, 
a yearning for what is fine or high." 
When Esau did not perish Jacob should have re-
turned the inheritance. When the Stock paper was found 
to be so valuable the slightest tinge of morality would 
have dictated its prompt return. Respondent has this 
dubious satisfaction "* * * nevertheless, being crafty, 
I caught you with guile." 2 Cor. 12:16. 
Because a decisive question has been overlooked 
and because an etror has been made with respect to an 
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important principle of law, the writer firmly believes 
that a rehearing should be granted. 
April27, 1953 
· Respectfully submitted, 
BURTON W. MUSSER 
Amicus Curire 
307 Utah Oil Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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